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PRESSING THE NCAPA PARADIGM: TOO
MUCH FORM FOR AD HOC
ADJUDICATORY RULEMAKING
BURNELE V. POWELLt
Administrative law has long struggled to delineate the constraints upon an
administrative agency's decision to promulgate a rule during the course of an
adjudication. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently had its first opportu-
nity to review such ad hoc agency rule-makingprocedures in North Carolina ex
rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, in which the
court invalidated a rule adopted by the Insurance Commissioner during an adju-
dication to approve a proposed rate increase. In this article, Professor Powell
scrutinizes this supreme court decision in light of the North Carolina Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Concluding that the court's decision places an undue burden
on agency discretion to proceed by adjudicatory rulemaking, Professor Powell
callsfor judicial recognition that unless an agency is subject to spec9fc legislative
limitations, it should be given wide discretion under the Act to respond to the
varying circumstances that come before it.
Perhaps the most problematic area in administrative law is determining
when it is appropriate for an agency to hold a party to a duty that is an-
nounced and applied in the pending adjudicatory proceeding. Thirty years of
federal and state litigation provide ample evidence that judicial review of an
agency decision to proceed by ad hoc rulemaking' in the course of an adjudi-
cation2 involves reconciling strong expressions of the need for fairness 3 with
demands for preserving agency discretion to respond to the facts of a particu-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1970, University of Mis-
souri-Kansas City; J.D. 1973, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1979, Harvard University.
1. The concept of ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking (meaning quite literally "for this special
purpose") recognizes that situations will arise in which the practical need of the agency to con-
clude a proceeding collides with the agency's realization that the novelty of the issues presented
raises questions for which there are no preexisting standards. Despite the generally endorsed view
that "adjudication is the process by which the agency applies either law or policy, or both, to the
facts of a particular case," B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINIsTRATivE LAw 183 (1976); See 1 F. COOPER,
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 177-78 (1965), the agency may be forced by circumstances to choose
either a new proscription to govern those subject to its authority or to acquiesce in conduct that it
disapproves. Of course, this unenviable choice does not arise if the agency is authorized to act
solely by adjudication or solely by rulemaking. See infra note 10.
2. Ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking is here contrasted with general statutory rulemaking. In
its broadest outline, rulemaking pursuant to a general statutory scheme envisions that, at a mini-
mum, the public will be given notice of the proposed rule and will be provided an opportunity to
comment on its merits prior to its promulgation. This approach, known as informal or notice and
comment rulemaking, may also be made more elaborate by imposing other preadoption duties on
the agency. An important additional requirement for what is called formal rulemaking is that the
agency's decision be made solely on the basis of a record adduced at a hearing. See infra note 6.
Ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking, on the other hand, involves agency adoption of a rule during a
rule-application proceeding rather than during the formalized statutory rule-making proceeding.
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lar case.4 These competing considerations serve to remind agencies of the con-
straints under which they operate. Agency awareness of these considerations
serves as a self-limiting device, often making it unnecessary for courts to strike
down the specific mode of procedure chosen by the agency. 5 The process is
one of reaffirming the validity of the paradigmatic structure6 implied by the
The rule adopted, therefore, is ad hoc because it has not had the benefit of notice and comment
envisioned by the formalized procedures for statutory rulemaking.
3. The Supreme Court's quintessential comment on restricting agencies to the use of
rulemaking when they have both rule-making and adjudicatory powers came in SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In Chenery the Court held that an agency was not barred from apply-
ing a new rule in the course of an adjudication simply because it also possessed powers to proceed
by rulemaking. In upholding the imposition of an ad hoc prohibition on the purchase of securities
by corporate officers during the period when their proposed plans for reorganization were before
the SEC, the Court allowed the Commission to use its adjudicatory authority even though it was
empowered to act by formalized rulemaking. The Court affirmed the need to resist stultifying the
administrative process, even though the new rule was applied retroactively. 332 U.S. at 202. The
Court, however, balanced its affirmation with a reminder that fairness implies that agencies have
less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct if they also
possess rule-making power. See also infra text accompanying note 37.
4. See, ag., Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879-81 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 379 F.2d 153, 159-60 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
H. & F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 365 (2nd Cir. 1972); Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d
99, 103-07 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), all of which preserved ad hoc
rulemaking.
5. A typical way in which the Supreme Court has applied the Chenery considerations to the
practical needs of a difficult case is demonstrated by NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974). During the course of an unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board surprised the em-
ployer by announcing that certain buyers for the company, although "managerial employees,"
were protected by the National Labor Relations Act and, therefore, were entitled to organize and
bargain. The court of appeals agreed with the employer that the Board's arguably new rule (aban-
doning a policy of excluding from the NLRA all managerial employees) could be validly an-
nounced only through rulemaking. Reversing the court of appeals in part, however, the Supreme
Court specifically noted that "the choice between rulemaking or adjudication lies in the first in-
stance within the Board's discretion." 416 U.S. at 294. Significantly, the Court pointed out that the
limitation on the Board's procedural choice was whether the choice would amount to an abuse of
discretion or violation of the NLRA. Id
6. The paradigm emerges from a juxtaposition of the general rules for agency action pro-
vided by federal and state administrative procedure acts. While mathematical precision is not
possible, see, e.g., B. ScHwARTz, supra note I, at 183, the broad categories on which the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as APA] ig premised contemplate:
(1) informal rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (also referred to as notice & comment rulemaking);
(2) formal rulemaking, pursuant to §§ 553, 556-57; (3) formal adjudication under §§ 554, 556-57;
and (4) informal adjudication, as an implied category arising out of the APA's most minimal
requirements: the requirement of "prompt notice" in response to "the denial in whole or in part
of a written application, petition, or other request ... made in connection with any agency pro-
ceedings" under § 555(e); the grant of an opportunity to achieve license compliance under
§ 558(c); and the grant of the right to petition for repeal of a rule under § 553(e). See W. GELL-
HoRN, C. BysE & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 176 (7th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
GELLHORN & BYsE].
Though not exactly parallel, the comparable categories under the North Carolina Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, ch. 1331, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691 (1974) (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (1978 & Cure. Supp. 1981)) [hereinafter cited as NCAPA] would involve
(1) informal rulemaking under § 150A-12; (2) formal rulemaking under §§ 150A-12,-23,-34,-36;
(3) formal adjudication under §§ 150A-23,-34,-36, see also § 150A-3, "Special Provisions on Li-
censing"; and (4) informal adjudication as an inferred category which includes the vast majority
of agency actions that do not involve rulemaking, notice and comment opportunities, or the for-
malities of a record preserving the process of the determination. See Daye, North Carolina's New
Aldministrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analsis, 53 N.C.L. Rnv. 833, 846-47 (1975).
In a schematic representation, a quadrant might be drawn with an activity line defining the
"X-axis" moving from "Adjudication" to "Rulemaking," while the procedural line is defined
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categorization of functions under the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and its state progeny.7 At the same time, however, it must be acknowl-
edged that distinct categories for informal or formal adjudication
8 and
rulemaking9 more realistically serve theoretical rather than functional
purposes.
Nevertheless, insistence upon a "pure' paradigm continues to motivate
along the "Y-axis," moving from "Informal" procedures towards the "Formal." Which consider-
ations apply will depend upon the particular organic statutory language. In the clear case, the
legislature has responded with explicit instructions that agency action is to be accomplished by
one or the other activities using either informal or formal procedures.
Absent the use of a "Formal Procedures" instruction, however, judicial construction has
mandated formality when the statutory language uses such code phrases as "notice and full hear-
ing," or when the Constitution so requires. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,
48-50, modfled, 339 U.S. 908 (1950). To invoke formal hearing procedures under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150A-23 (1978), the newly enacted "Uniform Standards for Mobile Homes" provides that
after written notice of a hearing "the licensee or applicant shall have the right to be heard in
person or through counsel. Afier the hearing the Board shall have the power to deny, suspend,
revoke or refuse to'renew the license.., or to impose a civil penalty ... ." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-143.14 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, Professor Davis' caution that precise definitions in the abstract are not necessar-
ily desirable or obtainable remains the key consideration, because procedures for one purpose or
context may be inapplicable for another purpose or context: "Here as elsewhere throughout the
law a proper classification requires that both the purpose and the effect of the particular classifica-
tion to [sic] be taken into account." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.2, at 6 (2d ed.
1979). See also Daye, supra note 6, at 845-48.
7. The APA was enacted June 11, 1946, see note 6 supra, and was repealed and incorpo-
rated into Title 5 of the United States Code by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat.
378. The MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1981) [hereinafter cited as the Model
Act] was approved by the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1946 and revised in 1961 and 1981. North Carolina and twenty-
five other states have passed statutes that show influences of the Model Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 150A-1 to -64 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981); GELLHORN & BYsE, supra note 6, (pt.2) app. B, at
1148.
8. The APA defines "adjudication" as "the agency process for the formulation of an order."
5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1976). An "order" is defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other
than rulemaking but including licensing." Id. § 551(6).
NCAPA uses the term "contested case" in lieu of "adjudication." A contested case is defined
as "any agency proceeding, by whatever name called, wherein the legal rights, duties or privileges
of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudica-
tory hearing." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1978).
9. The APA defines "rulemaking" as the "agency process for formulating, amending, or
repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976). "Rule" is defined as:
the whole or X, part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the ap-
proval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or
reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
Id. § 551(4).
NCAPA provides two definitions of "rule." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-10 (1978) provides that
for rule-making purposes, "'rule' means each agency regulation, standard or statement of general
applicability that implements or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure,
or practice requirements of any agency." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-58 (1978) provides that for the
purposes of The Registration of State Administrative Rules Act, "rule" means every rule, regula-
tion, ordinance, standard, and amendment thereto adopted by any agency and shall include rules
and regulations regarding substantive matters, standards for products, procedural rules for com-
plying with statutory or regulatory authority or requirements and executive orders of the
Governor."
19821
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those who seek to ease the responsibility of the reviewing court, to give cer-
tainty to the operations of agencies, and to minister to the expectations of ag-
grieved parties. 10 They urge that notwithstanding the need to disavow
formalistic solutions, agency decisions exercising the rulemaking/adjudication
choice should be limited by strict judicial oversight. I I By rigidly limiting each
judically allowed departure from the model, future departures can be all but
eliminated. Under this view, the need for agency flexibility in the exercise of
10. The asserted need to draw inviolate lines has provided more than a few occasions to
discuss administrative law theory. Condemning the lack of formalism that often characterizes the
operation of federal agencies, in 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management
went so far as to state that the federal agencies "constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of the Gov-
ernment, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers." PRESIDENT'S
Comm. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE Gov-
ERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (1937). Mr. Justice Jackson's colorful dissent in FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952), beautifully captures formalist sentiments:
Courts have differed in assigning a place to these seemingly necessary bodies in our
constitutional system. Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-
executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions
within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the
qualifying "quasi" is .m'plicit with confession that all recognized classifications have bro-
ken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might
use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
Id. at 487-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Protection of our constitutional framework, however, is no more assured by a prohibition on
the blending of functions within government agencies than by a flatly chosen prohibition of other
managerial tools (e.g., subdelegation of authority, ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, in-
traagency communications prior to an agency's final decision). Prohibitions provide little protec-
tion, because the danger is not in the managerial choice but in abuse of the choice. Accordingly,
our basic governmental framework must be protected through the assurance that there exist ade-
quate safeguards to control possible abuses. As Professor Davis has eloquently observed: "We
have gone far beyond Montesquieu. We have learned that the danger of tyranny or injustice lurks
in unchecked power, not in blended power." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT § 108, at 25
(3d ed. 1972).
11. See, for example, Professor Schwartz's vigorous denunciation of the Court's decision in
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). In Wyman-Gordon the Court upheld enforce-
ment of a "rule" issued during an adjudication. The Court reasoned that though the agency's
previously announced general requirement that employers furnish lists of employees to unions
involved in elections (the so-called prospective "rule" of Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B.
1236 (1966)) could not be enforced as an official rule (since it lacked the APA's formalities), it was
nonetheless applicable to the Wyman-Gordon parties as part of the order requiring the holding of
the election. This attempt by the Court to endow the agency's action with both the substance of an
APA rule requiring formal rulemaking and the benefits of enforcement as an order led Schwartz
to declare:
yman-Gordon weakened the inducement to promulgate rules by failing to distinguish
between the proper spheres of legislative and judicial power. Agencies such as the
NLRB will be given such an incentive only if the courts recognize that the use of rule-
making to make innovations in agency policy is fairer than total reliance on case-by-caseadjudication and are willing to condemn substitutions of adjudications for rulemaking to
accomplish marked policy departures.
B. SCHwARTZ, supra note I, at 188.
The more common issue, however, is whether rulemaking should be permitted when the
agency has not committed itself to "total reliance on case-by-case adjudications," but rather haschosen between procedures in response to strategic factors. The same problems of information
gathering, surprise, and retroactivity exist in those situations. In the strategic case, however, cost-
allocation questions are involved, not merely problems arising out of competing legislative and
judicial roles. When the agency has made a rational assessment of the problem and has concluded
that exigencies justify placing the burdens of surprise and unfaimness on the adjudicating party,adherence to rule formalism is a less compelling concern because the factors that cause that party
to cry "Why me?" have already been weighed in the balance.
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discretion about how to proceed is affirmed in principle but allowed only to
the extent this need is not foreclosed by strictly applied judicial demands for
adherence to prior precedent. Thus, what begin as judicial considerations
harden over time into judicial constraints.
This tendency towards a restrictive view of the extenuating "considera-
tions" justifying departures from the model was illustrated most recently in
State ex rel Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau.1 2 Com-
missioner v. NCRB afforded the North Carolina Supreme Court its first oppor-
tunity since the adoption of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act
(NCAPA)13 to review an agency decision to announce a rule in the context of
an adjudicatory proceeding rather than to use a formal rule-making proce-
dure.14 The case arose when, after public hearing, the Commissioner of Insur-
ance disapproved the North Carolina Rate Bureau's 1977 revised premium
rate schedule for automobile insurance written within the state. The Commis-
sioner concluded that the filing failed to comply with statutory requirements
because it was based upon unaudited data. The Commissioner deemed
unaudited data inherently unreliable. Is
The supreme court, in overturning the court of appeals' decision affirming
the Commissioner, 16 held his order to be null and void, approved the rate-
filing, and ordered escrowed funds to be remitted to member insurers. The
court applied a two-step analysis. First, it concluded that the scope of judicial
review was controlled by the revised NCAPA17 rather than the Insurance
Act.18 Second, it held that even though the Commissioner had general author-
ity to require that company data in insurance rate-making hearings be au-
dited, his action was improper in this instance because he failed to comply
with lawful procedures 19 and acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
20
Certainly there are benefits that accrue from applying precedent narrowly
to check discretionary determinations with which the court disagrees. To the
extent that a reviewing court can analogize the issues to prior cases, agency
12. 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547 (1980). Commissioner v. NCRB involved several appellees:
the North Carolina Rate Bureau, a body established pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-124.17, -
124.18 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (to which all insurance companies writing essential lines of insurance in
the State must belong); the State Reinsurance Facility, a body established by §§ 58-248.26 to -
248.39 (to which all insurance companies licensed to write motor vehicle insurance in the state
must belong for purposes of participating in a statutory reinsurance pool for high-risk drivers);
and various insurance companies doing business in the state.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 to -64 (1978 & Cune. Supp. 1981).
14. See supra notes 6 & 9 for statutory provisions concerning "rules" and "rulemaking."
15. 300 N.C. at 392-94, 269 S.E.2d at 577-78.
16. 41 N.C. App. 310, 255 S.E.2d 557 (1979).
17. The former statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1974), was repealed and replaced by the
current version, codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981). See supra note 6.
For a discussion of related aspects of the predecessor statute, see Hanft, Some Aspects of Evidence
in Adjudication byAdmnistrativeAgencies in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REv. 635 (1971); Com-
ment, Administrative Law--Evidence Before North Carolina Tribunals, 49 N.C.L. REv. 568 (1971).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-9 to 27.2 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
19. 300 N.C. at 419, 269 S.E.2d at 572. Consequently, the court held that lawful procedure
under NCAPA required formal adoption, prior to prospective application, of all substantive rules
adopted by ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking. 300 N.C. at 417, 269 S.E.2d at 571.
20. 300 N.C. at 420-21, 269 S.E.2d at 573.
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predictability will emerge. Rigorous use of precedent also responds to the
often expressed judicial fear that exceptions to otherwise clear standards risk
swallowing up the rules themselves.21 But these gains are short-term and are
purchased at the price of subtle erosion of legislative judgments about overlap-
ping and competing considerations to which statutory enactments must re-
spond. Ultimately, the desire to limit an agency's choice to proceed by ad hoc
rulemaking during adjudication must be tempered by the demands of legisla-
tive intent, even at the expense of paradigmatic considerations and the desire
to reaffirm precedent.
Though the temptation is great to seek rule formalism, courts cannot es-
cape the hard fact that in those instances in which the legislature's intent is not
explicitly stated, there is a need for a conscious and straightforward policy
choice between affirming the agency's view of the best method to resolve a
dilemma or substituting the court's own views. When faced with such a choice
the primary focus should be upon the legislature's judgment of who should
resolve the problem rather than upon the particular solution that the court
subjectively deems to be best suited to the purpose of the legislation. The
latter course imposes the legislative vision preferred by the court and subordi-
nates the agency to the court's perception. The former course, however, af-
firms the legislature's faith in the agency's ability wisely to exercise judgment
and emphasizes judicial cooperation in the agency's discretionary decision-
making. The judicial need for unqualifiedly reaffirming a legislative decision
to allow substantial agency discretion is the lesson suggested by NCAPA's for-
mal/informal rule-making and adjudication framework. An agency's choice to
proceed either by rulemaking or adjudication should be upheld absent a show-
ing that the agency has exceeded its delegated authority, violated some other
source of law or policy, failed to follow a mandatory procedural directive,
abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or committed some sim-
ilar breach of its administrative function.
22
Despite the author's sympathy for the supreme court's objectives, this ar-
ticle concludes that in Commissioner v. NCRB the court's response to an over-
zealous agency official was undesirably restrictive and will prove burdensome
to North Carolina's administrative agencies. Afforded the opportunity to pro-
hibit the Insurance Commissioner's actions based upon the narrow grounds
that he abused his discretion under the Insurance Act, the court eschewed that
direct course in favor of a resolution based squarely upon NCAPA. As a re-
sult, the North Carolina Supreme Court pressed to a point almost beyond rec-
21. See infra text accompanying note 38.
22. As the Supreme Court said in Chenerv:
In performing its important functions.. . [of filling in the statutory interstices] an ad-
ministrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual or-
der. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over
necessity. . . . There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statu-
tory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individ-
ual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion ,of the
administrative agency.
332 U.S. at 202-03.
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ognition the paradigmatic considerations that underlie NCAPA's distinctions
between rulemaking and adjudication. Three arguments summarize this criti-
cism: first, the court too hastily decreed the primacy of NCAPA as the State's
administrative review vehicle for insurance rate-setting; second, the court too
broadly defined NCAPA's constraints on agency rule-making procedures; and
third, the court reduced NCAPA's prohibition of arbitrary and capricious con-
duct to a catch-all classification barring conduct not otherwise prohibited by
NCAPA but of which the court disapproves.
The necessity for and manner of each of the court's interpretations are
here challenged. This article attempts to provide a foundation for judicial re-
view of agency decisions that is sympathetic to the need for agency discretion
in general and for agency discretion in the context of ad hoe adjudicatory
rulemaking in particular. The discussion proceeds in two parts. Part I presents
the supreme court's three principal determinations: (1) the choice of statutory
basis for reviewing the Commissioner's actions, (2) the procedural limits on
the Commissioner's actions, and (3) the appropriateness of exempting the
Commissioner'S actions from the general requirements of statutory rulemak-
ing. The possible motivations for the court's approach also are examined.
Part II is a three-part response to the positions taken by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. The first section examines the consequences of the court's
decision to resolve the case on the basis of NCAPA rather than the Insurance
Act. The second inquiry critically examines the court's interpretations of two
key NCAPA provisions-the prohibition on agency actions taken pursuant to
improper procedures and the prohibition against agency action that is arbi-
trary or capricious. The concluding response is a call for continual and sym-
pathetic judicial reappraisal of the need for agency discretion in the context of
ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking.
I. THE DECISION TO PRESS THE PARADIGM
4. The Choice Between Statutory Review Provisions
Although the supreme court's disposition was based upon ten distinct
holdings,2 3 it is the first holding that reflects the court's views about the basic
categories of the NCAPA paradigm. In that initial holding the court ad-
dressed the question whether the Commissioner was forbidden from requiring
audited rate-filing data because of his failure to comply with lawful proce-
dures. To make that determination the court first had to decide whether the
appropriate statutory authority for review was the Insurance Act or
NCAPA.24 Since the court viewed many of the provisions of the statutes to be
virtually identical, it held that the proper course was to proceed, to the extent
consistency was possible, by applying the scope of judicial review standards of
23. 300 N.C. at 392-94, 269 S.E.2d at 557-58.
24. The judicial review provisions of NCAPA were initially held applicable to the Insurance
Act in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460 (1977).
1982]
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both the Insurance Act and NCAPA.25 The court observed that both statutes
empower reviewing courts to affirm, reverse, modify, or remand a decision for
further proceedings.2 6 The court, however, noted that there were differences
between the two acts. Under NCAPA the reviewing court can act in those
instances when the substantial rights of a petitioner "may have been
prejudiced" by improper agency action. The Insurance Act, however, autho-
rizes judicial review when substantial rights of an aggrieved party "have been
prejudiced" because the Commissioner's determination was impermissible for
any of six reasons also forbidden under NCAPA. 27 Under the provisions of
the Insurance Act, the Commissioner's order additionally can be declared
"null and void." Upon consideration of the slightly wider scope of review
under NCAPA and the need to harmonize practically identical statutes, the
court held NCAPA to be the controlling judicial review statute in insurance
rate-making cases.28 Nevertheless, consistent with the search for a salutary
harmonization of the statutes, the court looked to the Insurance Act -and its
authorization to declare actions "null and void" -for a definition of its full
remedial powers.
29
B. The Commissioner' Scope of Authorit
The determination of which statute would apply was of crucial impor-
25. 300 N.C. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559.
26. G.S. § 15OA-51 (1978) provides in pertinent part:
The court may affirm the decisiop of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the
pc titioners may have been prejudiced because the agency findings, inferences, conclu-
sions, or decisions are:
(I) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150A-29(a) or G.S.
150A-30 in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150A-51 (1978).
27. The Insurance Act provides in pertinent part:
So far as necessary to the decision and where presented, the court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning and applicability of the terms of any action of the Commissioner. The
court may affirm or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, declare the same null and
void, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the deci-
sion if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Commis-
sioner's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions, or
(2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commissioner, or
(3) Made upon unlawful proceedings, or
(4) Affected by other errors of law, or
(5) Unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as
submitted, or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.6(b) (1975).
28. 300 N.C. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559.
29. Id. at 395-96, 269 S.E.2d at 559.
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tance. Given the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding that the scope of
review provisions of NCAPA and the Insurance Act are essentially the same, it
could dismiss the significance of the arguably lower threshold for judicial re-
view under NCAPA while at the same time applying the more extensive reme-
dies of the Insurance Act. Moreover, by basing its review on NCAPA, the
court was able to reach beyond the Insurance Act to pronounce broad princi-
ples of agency restraint that are grounded upon the terms of a generally appli-
cable statute.
Thus, with the case cast as a vehicle for a general discussion of proper
agency rule-making procedures under NCAPA, there remained only the spe-
cific task of deciding whether the Commissioner's demand for audited data
was "in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Agency," "made
upon unlawful procedure," or "arbitrary or capricious."
30
The court held that the Commissioner had not acted beyond his author-
ity, because he had implicit power to declare unaudited data unreliable in an
insurance rate-making hearing.3 1 It nevertheless found the Commissioner's
actions impermissible on the ground that the demand for audited data was
"made upon unlawful procedure" as contemplated by G.S. 150A-51(3).32 The
court stated that this provision, while seemingly repetitious of the prohibition
against agency action "in excess of statutory authority," addresses a quite dif-
ferent concern. The phrase "in excess of statutory authority" refers to the gen-
eral authority of an administrative agency properly to discharge its statutory
responsibilities. 33 The court viewed the phrase "made upon unlawful pro-
ceedings" as referring to the procedures in fact employed by the agency in
discharging its statutorily authorized acts.34 Distinguishing these two provi-
sions, the court.reasoned that while the Commissioner had the general statu-
tory authority to require audited data in the particular agency proceeding, he
had failed to follow lawful procedures in attempting to do so.
35
The unlawfulness of the procedure turned ultimately upon whether the
Commissioner's order was exempt from formal rulemaking under one of the
six exclusions from the definition of a rule under G.S. 150A-10, or was instead
subject to the minimum procedural requirements of G.S. 150A-9, which pro-
vides that all rules must be adopted in substantial compliance with NCAPA
rule-making provisions.36 Only the exclusions at G.S. 150A-10(4) and (6)--
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-51(2), (3), (6) (1978). See supra note 26.
31. 300 N.C. at 396-400,269 S.E.2d at 560-62. The Insurance Act provides that the Commis-
sioner shall:
have power and authority to make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, to
enforce, carry out and make effective the provisions of this Chapter, and to make such
further rules and regulations not contrary to any provision of this Chapter which will
prevent practices injurious to the public by insurance companies. . . . The Commis-
sioner may likewise, from time to time, withdraw, modify or amend any such regulation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
32. 300 N.C. at 419, 269 S.E.2d at 572.
33. Id. at 408, 269 S.E.2d at 566 (emphasis in original).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 409-12, 269 S.E.2d at 567-68.
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"statements of policy or interpretation that are made in the decision of a con-
tested case" and "interpretative rules and general statements of policy," re-
spectively -were deemed pertinent to the question of the order's exemption.
37
The Commissioner contended that the auditing requirement was "interpreta-
tive," but the court responded that "the interpretative-rule exclusion, if not
confined to proper boundaries, could well subsume the rulemaking provi-
sions."'38 The auditing requirement was thus held to be subject to the rule-
making provisions of NCAPA because it filled'the interstices of the Insurance
Act by imposing substantive requirements.
C The Exemption for Ad Hoc Rulemaking
In his alternative argument, the Commissioner asserted authority to es-
tablish rules through the case-by-case process of administrative adjudication.
The Commissioner relied primarily upon dictum in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
39
in which the Supreme Court noted the "stultification" of agency procedures
that would result from denying informed administrative discretion to proceed
by either general rulemaking or by individual ad hoc adjudication. The
United States Supreme Court declared that a review of agency action is com-
plete "when it becomes evident that the. . . action is based upon substantial
evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress."
'40
While conceding that the choice between statutory and ad hoc adjudica-
tory rulemaking rests primarily within the informed discretion of the agency,
the North Carolina Supreme Court stressed that the agency's discretion to pro-
ceed by ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking could not be viewed as "unbridled"
or exercisable without considering other factors.41 The court pointed to the
Supreme Court's observation in Chenery that the discretion to use ad hoc
rulemaking in adjudications was necessary to respond to situations in which
(1) the type of problem could not have been foreseen; (2) the agency had no
relevant general rule upon which to rely; (3) the agency lacked sufficient expe-
rience with the particular problem; or (4) the problem was so specialized and
varying in nature that formulation of a general rule was impossible.
42
In addition to referring to Chenery's restrictive language, however, the
North Carolina Supreme Court asserted that clarification in this area of the
law was required because the Supreme Court had inadequately defined the
limits of ad hoc adjudications. The court found the Supreme Court's opinion
in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon43 to be uninstructive on whether an administra-
tive agency can overrule prior rules through adjudication after private parties
have acted in reliance on them.44 Furthermore, the North Carolina court
37. Id. at 410, 269 S.E.2d at 567.
38. Id. at 412, 269 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Daye, supra note 6, at 853).
39. 332 U.S. at 202-03. See supra note 3.
40. Id. at 207.
41. 300 N.C. at 414, 269 S.E.2d at 569.
42. Id.
43. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). See also supra note 11.
44. Id. at 415, 269 S.E.2d at 570; see supra note 11. The court's treatment of Wyman-Gordon
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viewed the two Supreme Court cases as contradictory.4 5 The couri contrasted
the holding in Morton v. Ruiz 46 that an agency, even when it had first opened
the way by adopting interpretive rules, could not make law through ad hoe
decisions reflecting those interpretive rules,47 with the holding in NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. ,48 that the Labor Board, even without first issuing an interpre-
tative rule, could make new law in an adjudication.4 9 The North Carolina
Supreme Court's assault upon these crucial cases was more than a rhetorical
flourish, however. A need to clarify supposedly unresolved questions about
the federal APA's view of the choice between rulemaking and adjudication
was critical to the court's implicit shift away from the established federal
maxim that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication is ultimately the
agency's.
50
The North Carolina Supreme Court's "superior rule" to guide agencies in
choosing between basic statutory rulemaking and ad hoc adjudicatory
rulemaking was patterned after an analysis by Professor Frank Cooper.
51
Cooper's theory relies upon the language in Chenery relating to "sufficient
[agency] experience with a particular problem" and the recognition of
problems "so specialized and varying in nature as to be incapable of capture
within the boundaries of a general rule." 52 Cooper adds the admonition that
"the process of rulemaking should be utilized except in cases where there is a
danger that its utilization would frustrate the effective accomplishment of the
agency's functions."'5 3 Thus, by adopting Cooper's approach,54 the court en-
dorsed a rather stringent balancing test as a check upon a choice that was
apparently relies upon a consensus in that case of four opinions in which a majority of six justices
agreed that the so-called "rule" announced for prospective application in Excelsior did not consti-
tute a rule within the meaning of the APA. The four justices in the plurality, however, thought
that to the extent the Excelsior "directive" could be given effect, it was as an order to the parties in
the particular case. 394 U.S. 759, 770 (1969). Despite the confusion, however, the Court's refusal
to require formal rule-making procedures confirmed the legitimacy of a procedure that subse-
quently has been utilized almost exclusively by the NLRB: ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking. Such
consistency belies the suggestion of ambiguity.
45. 300 N.C. at 415, 269 S.E.2d at 570.
46. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
47. 300 N.C. at 415, 269 S.E.2d at 570.
48. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
49. 300 N.C. at 415, 269 S.E.2d at 570. The rhetorical treatment of .Bell ferosvace Co. and
Ruiz leaves one unable to fix the outer boundary of the court's position. One commentator, seek-
ing to harmonize these Supreme Court decisions, has suggested:
It would be a mistake to conclude on the basis of the Ruiz holding that the use of agency
adjudication to develop policy generally is newly restricted by the decision. The Court's
reaffirmation in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., decided two months later, of the Board's
authority to develop new policies by adjudication, emphasizes the point. In Bell Aero-
space, the Ruiz decision was neither cited nor distinguished and seemingly was not re-
garded as relevant to the regulation of collective labor relations.
Fuchs, Development and Divers#Fcallon in .4dministrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 83, 102
(1977). See generally, supra note 5; infra note 111.
50. See supra note 22.
51. 1 F. CooPERt, supra note 1, at 181-82.
52. 332 U.S. at 202-03.
53. 300 N.C. at 416, 269 S.E.2d at 570 (quoting 1 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 181-82).
54. 300 N.C. at 415-16, 269 S.E.2d at 570-71.
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previously within "the informed discretion of the administrative agency." 55
The new test, as explained by Cooper, provides that "[u]nless the balance
clearly preponderates in favor of the ad hoc adjudication method, the agency
should utilize rule-making procedures."
56
The need to move from the specific concerns of the Insurance Act to the
broad principles of NCAPA was justified, at least in part, by the court's desire
for uniform standards for review of agency decisions and the resulting ease of
judicial management. Because the court viewed NCAPA and the Insurance
Act as providing virtually identical remedies, however, the court's decision
simultaneously addressed all other agencies except those specifically exempted
from NCAPA.5 7 Moreover, since the court had interpreted the procedural
limitations of G.S. 150A-51(3) as proscribing the use of procedural channels
and standards not specifically provided by NCAPA, as well as the substantive
effects of using procedural channels and standards that were, in fact, provided
by NCAPA, it followed that the creation of a rule by the use of ad hoc adjudi-
cation in preference to statutory rulemaking was a result "made upon unlaw-
ful procedure," as prohibited by G.S. 150A-51(3), and "arbitrary and
capricious" rulemaking as prohibited by G.S. 150A-51(6).58
D. Assessing the Court's Motivations
In Commissioner v. NCRB the impact of unarticulated constraints was
55. 332 U.S. at 203. Assessing the exercise of the choice between "form" and "necessity" has,
however, been seen as a traditional endeavor. As Professor Nathanson has noted:
[W]hichever method the agency chooses, the same fundamental elements of administra-
tive discretion are present, and the same fundamental standards of judicial review must
be applied-whether the agency has acted within the scope of the delegation and
whether there was a rational basis for the exercise of its judgment. Similarly when the
agency is authorized to act only by individual order,.., the same area of discretion
may be present and the same general standard of judicial review be applicable ....
Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 489-90
(1950) (footnote omitted).
56. 300 N.C. at 416, 269 S.E.2d at 570 (citing 1 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 182).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) makes NCAPA inapplicable to the ex-
tent that "any statute makes specific provisions to the contrary." That section specifically exempts
five agencies: the Employment Security Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Board, the Department of Correction, the Utilities Commission, and the Industrial Commission.
The exemption of the first three is probably explained by their substantial federal regulation, but
the reasons for the exemption of the Utilities and Industrial Commissions are unclear. Daye, supra
note 6, at 841.
In addition, § 150A-l(a) partially exempts three agencies. The Department of Revenue and
the Department of Transportation are exempt from the rule-making and adjudication provisions
of Articles 2 and 3. These exemptions probably recognize the large numbers of revenue and
driver's license proceedings and reflect the General Assembly's concern that the technical require.
ments of NCAPA might prove burdensome. Daye, supra note 6, at 841. The University of North
Carolina is exempt from the judicial review provision of Article 4. See McDonald v. University of
North Carolina, 299 N.C. 457, 263 S.E.2d 578 (1980).
Finally, because NCAPA is applicable only to "agencies," it does not apply to agencies of the
legislative or judicial branches of the state government, or to cities, counties, other municipal
corporations or political subdivisions of the state, or any agency of such subdivision. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150A-2(l) (1978). See also Markum, A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts'
Percepltion of.Review ofAdministrativeAction, 12 N.C. CENr. L.J. 21, 63-64 (1980).
58. 300 N.C. at 419-21, 269 S.E.2d at 572-73.
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evidenced by the supreme court's choice of statutory review. Although
NCAPA was deemed controlling in order to ease the judicial review process
and to harmonize only subtly different statutory mandates,59 more was re-
quired of the court. It might be granted that applying NCAPA while saving as
much of the Insurance Act as was helpful eased judicial discomfort about the
prospect of deciding which of competing review procedures should govern. In
addition, since the Insurance Act authorizes a court to declare agency action
null and void, reliance on both acts had the complementary effect of providing
stronger judicial sanctions. 60 What was required of the court, however, and
what is conspicuously lacking from the court's discussion, is a convincing justi-
fication for the more basic assumption that the General Assembly intended the
generally applicable NCAPA to apply in the face of the alternatively declared
and specifically tailored review standards of the Insurance Act.
6 1
While it is not known precisely what motivated the court's decision, two
facts should be highlighted. First, the court suggested that it (and apparently
the General Assembly) was exasperated by the dilatory action of the Insurance
Commissioner. 62 Second, as a result of the court's decision to resolve the case
on the basis of the more broadly applicable NCAPA, judicial authority was
enhanced at the expense of executive and legislative powers.
These considerations, however, do not address deeper concerns that may
have motivated the court. Even disregarding as a plausible explanation for the
court's reaction its desire to foreclose all but the most innocuous uses of ad hoc
adjudicatory rulemaking, the possible rationales are numerous. Besides satis-
fying the obvious desire to chastise this particular commissioner, the decision
to "press the paradigm" might well reflect a philosophical commitment to rule
formalism. The need to fashion a general rule-making and adjudication
scheme and to bend all available considerations towards that end might have
influenced the court's approach. Political and psychological considerations
may also exist. The psychological motivation might be rooted in an underly-
59. Id. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559; see also supra Section I-A.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
61. As a general rule of statutory construction, the passage of a remedial act warrants defer-
ence to new expressions of legislative intent to the extent that the legislature has not specifically
preserved the previously existing scheme. See, ag., Weston v. J.L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N.C.
263, 75 S.E. 800 (1912). The court, however, did not apply this rule; rather, it relied upon the rule
for statutes in part materia:
Where two statutes on the same subject, or on related subjects, are apparently in conflict
with each other, they are to be reconciled, by construction, so far as may be, on any fair
hypothesis, and validity and effect given to both, if this can be done without destroying
the evident intent and meaning of the later act.
State Bd. of Agriculture v. White Oak Buckle Drainage Dist., 177 N.C. 222, 226, 98 S.E. 597, 599
(1919). Resort to the inpartrmaterla doctrine required an analysis of the Insurance Act in order to
determine its meaning and intent for purposes of harmonization. Thus, the court had to consider
the public interest, the purpose of the act, and public policy as declared in legislative acts. See id
62. Since he took office on January 5, 1973, the Commissioner has had difficulty in having his
orders upheld by the appellate courts. As of October 1981 in reported decisions in which the
Commissioner has been a party, his position has either been reversed (at least in part) or re-
manded in 41 of 50 cases (82%). In the court of appeals, reversals or remands occurred in 28 of 34
cases (82%); in the North Carolina Supreme Court reversals or remands were ordered in 13 of 16
cases (81%).
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ing insistence that rules set forth for a rule-making and adjudication scheme
must maintain meaningful limits on legislative delegations of authority to the
executive branch. This consideration may reflect judicial concern that by fail-
ing to strictly limit legislative delegations of discretionary authority courts
could open the door to the expanded exercise of power by individuals who
cannot be held directly accountable by the electorate. 63 Furthermore, these
psychological and political considerations can combine to reflect more practi-
cal judicial concerns about limiting bureaucratic excesses. A court might de-
sire not only that rules should be set to limit the role of bureaucrats, but less
obviously, that once the bounds are set, bureaucrats should be continuously
reminded of their demarcation. In this view, paradigmatic distinctions be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication are required not only to rein in agency
officials, but also to remind other agencies of the dangers of conduct at the
extremities of their delegated powers.
Finally, one cannot overlook the possibility that the North Carolina
Supreme Court may have reached this result on some other basis. Further
speculation is of limited utility, however, and would only distract from the
more important inquiry into whether the decision withstands scrutiny on its
stated terms. The precise motivation of the court notwithstanding, it is hoped
that future cases will clarify the court's views on the three points considered in
the next section: harmonizing alternative scopes of review with NCAPA; limit-
ing ad hoc rulemaking; and applying NCAPA restrictions on unlawful proce-
dures and arbitrary or capricious agency action.
63. Agency overreaching is one aspect of the larger problem of the delegation of discretion-
ary authority. The general concern is that power will be inappropriately transferred to unauthor-
ized persons. A transfer can be inappropriate, however, either because the power is not one that
the legislature may transfer, or because a delegable power has not in fact been transferred. The
first of these concerns is a delegation doctrine issue; the second is an issue of agency operation
ultra vires. GELHORN & BYsE, supra note 6, (pt.1), at 52-56. Common to both concerns is the fear
that the representative concept of democracy is being undermined. Professor Louis Jaffe attrib-
utes that fear to our country's accepted political philosophy that controverted issues of policy
should be settled by the organ of government that the people vested with the power to make laws.
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power (pt. 2), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 563 (1947).
Jaffe traces this "doctrine that the legislature cannot delegate power to 'make laws'" over a four
hundred year period to Locke, Coke, Story, Kent, and the "rule that an agent cannot delegate a
power entrusted to it because of fitness or confidence." Id. at 563-64.
Commenting upon the ultra vires aspect of the problem, Professor Stewart observed that
Congress frequently has granted broad discretion to agencies because of:
1) the impossibility of specifying at the outset of new governmental ventures the precise
policies to be followed; 2) lack of legislative resources to clarify directives; 3) lack of
legislative incentives to clarify directives; 4) legislators' desire to avoid resolution of con-
troversial policy issues; 5) the inherent variability of experience; 6) the limitations of
language.
Stewart, The Reformnation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1677 n.27
(1975). Despite these practical concerns, courts continue to have problems with broad delegations
because of the increased risk that heads of agencies will exercise powers beyond those intended by
the legislature. For example, Judges J. Skelley Wright and Henry Friendly have urged that to the
greatest extent possible, legislative bodies should temper their delegations of power with guide-
lines, standards, and sympathetic responses to the concerns ofjudges, commentators, and the pub-
lic. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 586-87 (1972); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 163-75 (1962). Judge Wright concedes that the task of fashioning
such limits may ultimately have to be worked out by the courts. WRIGHT, supra, at 587.
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II. PUTTrING THE PROCEDURE ACT PARADIGM IN PERSPECTIVE
4. The Implications of the Choice of Statutory Review
The major shortcoming of the supreme court's analysis is that NCAPA, as
well as its predecessor statute,64 limits judicial review to those instances in
which "adequate" procedure for review is not available under some other stat-
ute.65 While the court reaffirmed the view announced in Jarrell v. Board of
Adjustment66 that review procedures are adequate only if the scope of review
is equal to that under NCAPA, it did not elaborate upon what has been called
a "problem which merits further attention." 67 There was no definitive expla-
nation whether the court viewed the Insurance Act as "adequate" but contain-
ing specific provisions contrary to NCAPA, "inadequate" and thus requiring
complete substitution of NCAPA procedures, or "partially inadequate" and
thus requiring substitution of NCAPA procedures only to the extent non-
equivalent provisions might otherwise have to be applied.
6 8
These distinctions involve important considerations. If an organic act's
provisions are specifically contrary to a subsequent act, the organic act cannot
apply, because a new legislative direction has been announced. Inadequacy of
an organic act, on the other hand, signifies that what the legislature originally
provided under the organic act can no longer be viewed as complete, because
added legislative provisions have extended the act to new, though substan-
tively similar, matters. Finally, a conclusion of partial inadequacy-that is to
say, adequate in some specific respects, but requiring some NCAPA substitu-
tions-recognizes a mixed result: some of what the legislature said in the or-
ganic act has continuing applicability, but statutory extensions have included
new matters that depart in wholly incompatible ways from the original stat-
ute.69 The supreme court, however, saw no need to address these comparative
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (effective February 1, 1976). G.S. 143-307 was replaced by
G.S. 150A-43, Law of March 24, 1975, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 44, ch. 69, § 4; Law of April 12, 1974,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691, ch. 1331, § 2.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ISOA-43 (1978) provides in pertinent part that "[amny person who is
aggrieved by a final agency decision ... is entitled to judicial review of such decision under this
Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by some other statute, in which
case the review shall be under such other statute." See Daye, supra note 6, at 899.
66. 258 N.C. 476, 480, 128 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1963).
67. See Daye, supra note 6, at 900 n.306.
68. Id. at n.305.
69. These categories are only illustrative. It is certainly not always the case that "inade-
quate" connotes a total lack of adequacy. Professor Daye addressed the ambiguous nature of the
term "inadequate" when he noted that even though "it would be infinitely preferable to conclude
as a policy judgment that if another statute is inadequate in any aspect, judicial review may be
had under the NCAPA in its entirety. . . it is not unreasonable to argue that the NCAPA's
provisions are applicable only to the extent that another statute is inadequate."' Id. at 900 n.306.
He cautioned that if the courts treated "partial inadequacy" as requiring total substitution,
problems could arise in connection with individual judicial review statutes that provide "specific
provisions to the contrary" of NCAPA. Id. at 841 n.39. In response to such possibilities, Daye
urged that effectuating all parts of NCAPA requires that courts distinguish between statutes that
are "inadequate" and those that contain "specific provision to the contrary." Id.
The difficulty is that there are at least two categories, each of which contains two subsets. The
"adequate" category contains: (1) those organic acts that are wholly adequate in that they require
no substantive embroidering, because they are the equivalent of the subsequent act, and (2) those
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considerations. The court's efforts focused instead upon a determination of
which statute provided the widest judicial review mandate. Difficulties of in-
terpretation relating to the Insurance Act's purpose were bypassed with a mere
recognition that "there are of course subtle differences"' 70 between the Act and
NCAPA, as if to suggest that the broader scope of NCAPA review, coupled
with the subtleties of the statutory differences, would sustain the conclusion
that "[f]or this reason, and in the interest of uniformity in judicial review of
administrative decisions... we hold that G.S. 150A-51 is the controlling ju-
dicial review statute in insurance ratemaking cases."
'71
In its desire to make NCAPA the applicable review provision, the court
inadequately explored possible competing expressions of legislative intent rep-
resented by the Insurance Act. Due to the General Assembly's flat refusal to
provide that NCAPA would be the controlling provision for review of all
agency actions, courts were obliged to explore the significance of at least three
possible impacts upon the various organic acts not specifically exempted from
NCAPA. First, courts could conclude that the review schemes under an or-
ganic act and NCAPA are identical and no substantive analysis was war-
ranted. Review under either of identical provisions would produce the same
result. Second, courts could conclude that because of slight differences in the
language of an organic act and NCAPA, the General Assembly necessarily
intended that one or the other control. This approach would mean that the
"virtually identical" scope of review provisions under the Insurance Act and
NCAPA nevertheless required analysis in order to explain the significance, if
any, of their different threshold requirements for review. For example, judi-
cial review is authorized only when the petitioner's actions "have been
prejudiced" under the Insurance Act,72 but when the petitioner "may have
statutes that must be deemed adequate because they provide more than the threshold protections
of the subsequent act. On the other hand, the "inadequate" category contains those organic acts
that are: (1) partially inadequate, in that they are in some respects less than the substantive mini-
mum of the subsequent act, and (2) wholly inadequate, in that they totally fail to provide the
minimum requirements of the subsequent act.
For practical purposes relating to the ease of judicial implementation, partially adequate or-
ganic acts are treated as if they are wholly inadequate. See infra text accompanying note 70. This
treatment allows the substantively equivalent provisions of the organic act to be given effect
(though under the guise of the subsequent act) while also assuring the additional minimum pro-
tections of the new act. While this approach eases judicial interpretation, it fails to address the
possibility that the reason the organic act appears partially inadequate, and thus in need of substi-
tution, is because procedural protections available under the subsequent act were intentionally not
granted by the organic act. In response to this possibility, a close examination of the conceptual
framework of the organic act is required in order to determine whether the apparent inadequacy is
real (viz., an oversight or the product of superseding legislation) or apocryphal (as when the new
protection would be inconsistent with the policies of the existing organic scheme).
70. 300 N.C. at 395, 269 S.E.2d at 559.
71. Id. The supreme court noted that "to the extent that G.S. 58-9.6(b) adds to the judicial
review function ... and in light of the virtually identical thrust of the two statutes, we elect to
proceed by applying the review standards of both G.S. 58-9.6 and G.S. 150A-51, where those
standards may be construed as being consistent with each other." Id
72. N.C. GEN STAT. § 58-9.6(b) (1975) provides in pertinent part, "The court may affirm or
reverse the decision of the Commissioner, declare the same null and void, or remand the case for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appel-
lants ha'e been prejudiced . . ." (emphasis added).
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been prejudiced," under NCAPA. 73 Though NCAPA's lower threshold for
court intervention suggests the strict judicial oversight position adopted by the
supreme court, this interpretation does not address the express words of the
Insurance Act, which limit judicial review to those instances in which the ag-
grieved party has first demonstrated something more than the theoretical pos-
sibility of agency wrongdoing.
Finally, courts could conclude that given the existence of an organic act
and the General Assembly's failure to make NCAPA explicitly applicable, it is
unclear whether the General Assembly intended NCAPA to apply. In this
instance, as in the second, a court would be called upon to resolve the uncer-
tainty by referring to the legislative history, weighing the demands of compet-
ing interpretations upon the legislative, executive, and judicial roles, and
considering the public policy implications of the contending courses of action.
Only after such an analysis, however, would it be appropriate to conclude, as
the supreme court concluded, that the generally applicable NCAPA should be
read as controlling the Insurance Act's existing scheme of integrated
provisions.
Given the court's practical concerns with standardizing agency review
procedures and easing judicial administration, its preference for NCAPA is
understandable. But its decision to apply the review standards for both the
Insurance Act and NCAPA, where consistent, suggests that the court was also
aware that application of NCAPA alone might upset implicit legislative bal-
ances represented by the statutes' subtle differences. Consequently, the larger
issue that the court left unaddressed is troublesome: whether the legislative
scheme envisioned by the Insurance Act depended so significantly on precisely
those subtleties that application of NCAPA should have been precluded. We
need only focus upon what was gained on behalf of judicial power (and the
NCRB) in one regard to suggest the magnitude of the possible loss of power
by the Commissioner. 74 The court construed a statute that arguably sought to
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (1978) provides in pertinent part, "The court may affirm the
decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify if
the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced . . ." (emphasis added).
74. Note the specific analysis of the court. The court began with the canon of construction
that favors a harmonization of subsequent acts with an existing act dealing with the same subject
matter. See supra note 57. Thus, the Insurance Act was to be followed only if. (1) it were statutorily
preserved by an exemption under NCAPA, or (2) its provisions gave more protection than those of
NCAPA. The court then noted that NCAPA provided wider remedial authority for reviewing
courts than did the Insurance Act. Accordingly, the court had to decide whether the Insurance Act
was adequate or inadequate. The court's decision to have NCAPA govern but to apply the Insur-
ance Act when possible indicates that the court, in effect, found that the Insurance Act was inade-
quate. Thus, NCAPA was to be applied.
The court was required to do more than note those differences. Even if there were differ-
ences, the court failed to realize that the Insurance Act could govern if it were designed to meet a
different statutory objective than NCAPA. As Llewellyn pointed out "a statute is not in pad
materia if its scope and aim are distinct or if a legislative design to depart from the general pur-
pose or policy of previous enactments may be apparent." Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 402 (1950). In order to determine whether the seemingly wider remedial powers under
NCAPA were actually contemplated as enlargements of the Insurance Act, the court should have
analyzed whether the wider authority of NCAPA was: (1) wider and compatible with the concep-"
tual scheme of the Insurance Act, or (2) wider but antithetical to that conceptual scheme. Resolu-
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vest the Commissioner with broad discretion to act as an instrument of the
General Assembly's will as a more limited authorization to act subject to the
restraint of strict judicial oversight. Court review is now triggered by a show-
ing that a significant possibility of prejudice exists to a petitioner.75 The basis
for judicial review has become one of showing a risk of harm, rather than
actual harm itself.
76
The supreme court's desire to have the decision turn upon NCAPA's
paradigmatic considerations involved the court's weighing far more subtle is-
sues than the decision actually addressed. The court's difficulties in interpreta-
tion are partly traceable to a statutory scheme in which the Commissioner's
general statutory authority to engage in rulemaking and NCAPA's designation
of rate-setting procedures as quasi-adjudicatory "contested cases" 77 combine
to create the possibility for mixed rulemaking and adjudication. The court
needed to be sensitive to the limits of NCAPA. The Act's paradigmatic vision
of distinct categories for rulemaking and adjudication does not resolve the
question whether general authority to proceed by rulemaking is available
when, in the course of an adjudication, there arises the need to apply stan-
dards that did not predate the proceeding.78 Though the Insurance Act also
tion of this issue required a textual analysis of the policies and procedures of the Insurance Act, so
as not to conflict with the Insurance Act's established framework. Because statutory intent is more
faithfully realized by a presumption that the legislature did not intend to make needless changes
in the preexisting law, statutory construction required an analysis in light of the whole system, of
which NCAPA judicial review provisions form but a part, and the already existing judicial review
provisions of the Insurance Act. See H. BLAcK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAws §§ 104-06 (2d ed. 1911).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
76. See Daye, supra note 6, at 912. Additionally, more than a cursory incorporation into
NCAPA of the power to declare agency action "null and void" was required. While it is true that
NCAPA's grant of judicial authority to reverse, remand, or modify agency action carries with it
the power to prohibit agency conduct, the power to declare conduct null and void goes beyond
merely preventing enforcement of irregular agency action. That power is not only the power to
declare that the action cease, but also the power to reach every vestige of agency conduct in order
to declare that, for legal purposes, the action never occurred.
Such far reaching judicial authority would offset delegations of authority to the Commis-
sioner that involve substantial interferences with personal or economic interests (e.g., the authority
to arrest under warrant any person or persons about whom, in the Commissioner's opinion, there
is evidence of the commission of a crime, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.2 (1975), or to regulate the
solicitation of proxies in connection with capital stock or other equity securities of insurance com-
panies, Id § 58-9(2)). The failure to make the power to declare actions null and void available
under NCAPA suggests that the General Assembly was aware of the lower threshold for judicial
review contemplated under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (1978). See supra text accompanying
notes 22-37.
77. N.C. GEN STAT. § 150A-2(2) (1978).
78. Reliance might well be placed upon the policy declaration in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9,
that establishes "basic minimum procedural requirements for the adoption, amendment or repeal
of administrative rules." The conclusion that ad hoc rulemaking is prohibited by NCAPA must
ultimately turn upon a policy choice. While the inclusion of the provisions may express the Gen-
eral Assembly's preference for formalized rulemaking, the General Assembly specifically called
for "substantial compliance" and not for literal compliance with NCAPA's provisions. The objec-
tives of NCAPA are better served by reading "substantial compliance" as a recognition of the
continuing need for procedures that will not stultify agency action. Especially in light of long
federal experience predating NCAPA, the "substantial compliance" clause should be interpreted
as the equivalent of a "harmless error" provision. Judicial review should be focused upon specific
concerns with fairness of the agency's choice, not upon mere assertions of rule formalism. See
supra text accompanying notes 68 & 69.
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fails to address directly the problem of an adjudication/rulemaking mix, an
attempted resolution under NCAPA merely compounds the difficulty. Had the
court limited its review to an interpretation based solely upon the Insurance
Act, it not only would have limited the precedential effect of allowing an adju-
dicatory/rulemaking mix, but could have avoided altogether the problem of
interpreting the Insurance Act's grant of adjudicatory/rulemaking authority
under the scope of review and policy determinants provided in NCAPA.
In pursuing a solution based upon NCAPA, the court failed to consider
that formalistic notions based upon categorical distinctions between rulemak-
ing and adjudication are by definition insensitive to subtleties. Paradigmati-
cally, the considerations must be oversimplified: adjudication looks
retrospectively to determine whether specific parties have complied with previ-
ously existing standards; rulemaking envisions consideration of a standard
that is to be prospectively applied. Accordingly, once the supreme court identi-
fled the putative rule as a new standard and ascertained that it did not qualify
for exception from formal procedural requirements, it followed that the de-
mand for audited data was a rule which must be published as provided in the
formalized rule-making scheme. Without a specific NCAPA rule to govern
situations involving an adjudication/rulemaking mix, however, the court was
relegated to declaring that a general policy favoring formalized rulemaking
over ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking was consistent with the General Assem-
bly's definition of rulemaking under G.S. 150A-10.
79
The need to evolve agency standards in an informed, regularized fashion,
often stated as the justification for formalized rulemaking, could not alone
have sufficed to preclude ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking. The same need
existed in the more problematic early days of the APA when the Chenery rule
upholding ad hoc rulemaking was announced. 80 Over two decades later the
Supreme Court in Wyman-Gordon reaffirmed the necessity for agency flex-
ibility with respect to the adjudicatory process when it allowed enforcement,
as an order applicable to the parties, of what was at best a prospectively appli-
cable, but unpublished, new rule from a prior proceeding.81 Indeed, the North
Carolina Supreme Court itself has implicitly conceded the pragmatic nature of
its concerns for informed public participation and formality. Although en-
dorsement of Professor Cooper's-higher requirement for ad hoc adjudicatory
rulemaking makes plain the supreme court's general aversion to its use, the
court's need to distinguish Chenery on the facts also makes clear that it would
find no absolute bar to ad hoc solutions when the facts present the "proper"
case.
8 2
79. 300 N.C. at 417, 269 S.E.2d at 571.
80. 332 U.S. at 209. See also supra note 3.
81. 394 U.S. at 762-66. See also supra note 11.
82. The court is willing to accept retroactivity and surprise in those cases in which the need
for using ad hoc rulemaking is clear. Thus, the source of the supreme court's objections to ad hoc
rulemaking is primarily the agency's information base-whether the agency has availed itself of
the comments of similarly situated or otherwise interested parties. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 52-56. If the court is willing to accept Chenery-type retroactivity, it is difficult to under-
stand why it rejects the Wyman-Gordon solution, which limits retroactivity and surprise by
1982]
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Thus, the supreme court's resolution ultimately is unsatisfactory despite
its practical intent. While, in principle, support for eased judicial management
and opposition to potentially overreaching agency conduct is widespread,8
3
the view of administrative agencies suggested by the decision is disquieting.
For the sake of uniformity and judicial convenience, the court has substituted
inflexibly interpreted policies underlying a statutory framework84 designed as
a guide for an assortment of agencies, for the existing framework of the Insur-
ance Act. Absent the underlying statutory analysis, however, this presumption
of NCAPA's primacy was unjustified. In Commissioner v. NCB there was no
meaningful exploration of the significance of the apparently different thresh-
olds for review, no recognition that those differences may have been inten-
tional, no reference to the existence, if any, of legislative history, and no
consideration that the Insurance Act may have represented a legislative deci-
sion to place substantial discretionary authority in the Commissioner to meet
the exigencies of a highly technical field requiring strict agency oversight. Al-
though the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision to turn to NCAPA may
well have beenjustified on practical grounds, the lack of an explanatory analy-
sis suggests that the court's conclusion was compelled by other considerations.
These considerations merit closer examination.
B. Reassessing NCAP,4s Provisions
1. The Prohibition on Unlawful Proceedings
The supreme court ultimately concluded that the demand for audited
data was a substantive rule that required compliance with NCAPA's rule-
making provisions.85 In the court's view compliance was required even for
rules announced in the course of an adjudication.86 Only nonsubstantive rules
announced during a contested case were characterized as exempt from the
publication requirements of statutory rulemaking.8 7 Thus, the agency actions
upheld by the Supreme Court in Chenery and Wyman-Gordon, which involved
agency application of ad hoc adjudicatory rules to a subsequent case without
the publication and hearings formally required for rulemaking, were held stat-
utorily precluded under NCAPA.
The supreme court concluded that two considerations made it apparent
that substantive rules could not be given effect without the requisites of formal
making the agency's order prospective only. More troublesome is the rejection of Wyman-Gordon
in a case that did not raise the issue and which involved a statutorily designated class of required
participants, so that the probability of not receiving representative opinions was negligible. See
qpura note 11.
83. See supra note 63.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-l(b) (1978) provides: "The purpose and intent of this Chapter
shall be to establish as nearly as possible a uniform system of administrative procedure for State
agencies." This provision is qualified by the proviso in G.S. 150A-l(a): "This Chapter shall apply
except to the extent and in the particulars that any statute makes specific provisions to the
contrary."
85. 300 N.C. at 412, 269 S.E.2d at 568.
86. Id. at 417, 269 S.E.2d at 571.
87. Id.
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rulemaking. First, NCAPA contemplates that substantive rules will be treated
differently from nonsubstantive interpretive rules and policy statements.
88
More importantly, the court reasoned that G.S. 150A-10(6), which excludes
"interpretative rules and general statements of policy of the agency," would be
unnecessary if the "contested case" exemption of G.S. 50A-10(4) were applied
to rules having effect beyond the limits of a particular case. In the court's
view, if the requirement of subsection (4) were interpreted to mean that ex-
empted rules need only be "made in the decision of a contested case," it would
be redundant, since subsection (6) already generally exempted all nonsubstan-
tive rules.89 The court concluded, therefore, that G.S. 150A-10(4) provides for
a different kind of exemption-one limited solely to substantive statements
and policies that are applied within the particular case.90
By precluding all prospective applications of ad hoc rules, the court went
beyond what was statutorily required or desirable. The court correctly ob-
served that G.S. 150A-10(6) specifically contemplates an exception from rule-
making requirements for the nonsubstantive rules arising from the resolution
of contested cases.91 But it does not follow from this exemption for nonsub-
stantive rules that prospectively applicable substantive rules created by ad hoc
adjudicatory rulemaking may not also be freed from the formalized require-
ments of statutory rulemaking. The court read with a bias the provisions of
G.S. 150A-9 applicable to "the exercise of any rule-making authority con-
ferred by any statute" and calling for "substantial compliance" with its
terms.
92
Ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking does not arise by explicit statutory au-
thorization.93 Ad hoc adjudicatory rule-making authority arises under the In-
surance Act by implication from the General Assembly's simultaneous
conferral of rule-making and adjudicatory authority. Because ad hoc adjudi-
catory rulemaking is a concept that encompasses both rulemaking and adjudi-
cation, its designation as pure rulemaking or adjudication is inadequate and
improper. Accordingly, ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking should have been
treated as a special class of rule requiring a determination whether the general
policy requirements of G.S. 150A-9 should be read as applicable solely to
rulemaking in its pure, explicitly designated "statutory" form, or should be
extended as well to adjudicatory/rulemaking hybrids.
The better reading is that by reference to rule-making authority "con-
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10(6) (1978).
89. NCAPA's six different exceptions to the definition of "rule" led the court to find that
different types ofrules must have been contemplated. Furthermore, distinctions between various
types of rules were deemed important in determining the procedural requirements for promulgat-
ing a particular rule, as well as the legal effect of a challenged rule. 300 N.C. at 410,269 S.E.2d at
567.
90. 300 N.C. at 417, 269 S.E.2d at 571.
91. Thus, an agency may announce its policy and statutory interpretations without using
rulemaking procedures.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 (1978); see id § 150A-l(b).
93. See supra note 84.
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ferred by any statute,"'94 the General Assembly desired only to make clear its
intent with respect to explicitly conferred "pure" rulemaking. Even with re-
spect to such explicitly conferred rulemaking, however, exceptions from the
general requirement for formalized rulemaking exist for two situations.
Under G.S. 150A-10(6), nonsubstantive interpretive and policy statements-
both of which are within the technical definition of a rule95 -need not be pub-
lished, since the agency's intent is solely to state positions that lack the force of
law. The exemption from publication is necessary in order to overcome a stat-
utory definition of "rule" that is so broad that it would otherwise trigger the
formalities of rulemaking. In the other situation, formal rulemaking under
G.S. 150A-10(4) is exempt when the formalities of an adjudication have, in
effect, been substituted for the otherwise applicable requirements of formal
rulemaking. Because substantive ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking is such an
intimate part of an adjudication, its presumption of due deliberation arises
from the adjudicatory proceeding, and its publication, if any, is by means of
the order. It is for this reason that the court's assertion that a redundancy of
nonsubstantive rules occurs is more an allusion to form than substance. Non-
substantive rules are indeed already exempt under G.S. 150A-10(4), but for a
reason entirely different from the reason for their exemption under subsection
10(6). The formalities of rulemaking are unnecessary under G.S. 150A-10(6)
because the intended use of the rule is nonsubstantive, whereas the exemption
under subsection 10(4) arises because of the manner of creation of the rule, in
the context of a "contested case." In short, nonsubstantive rules are exempt
from the rigorous scrutiny of formalized rulemaking because the agency does
not intend to apply them as law (and this is so even if the agency diligently
scrutinizes them through an adjudication). On the other hand, substantive
rules are exempt precisely because they are diligently scrutinized by the adju-
dication. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to have ad hoc adjudica-
tory rules treated as if they are purely rules, their existence as case precedents
is all that should be required.
96
The source of the problem is the supreme court's insistence upon the rule-
making/adjudication dichotomy. It interpreted NCAPA's provisions to im-
pose the paradigm as a curb on agency discretion. Faced with the Commis-
sioner's contention that he was free to make ad hoc adjudicatory rules without
publication, the court responded that the Commissioner's failure to use statu-
torily formalized rulemaking in ordering that the data be audited resulted in
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 (1978) (emphasis added) states:
It is the intent of this Article to establish basic minimum procedural requirements
for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of administrative rules. Except for emergency
rules which are provided for in G.S. 150A-13, the provisions of this Article are applica-
ble to the exercise of any rulemaking authority conferred by any statute, but nothing in
this Article repeals or diminishes additional requirements imposed by law or any sum-
mary power granted by law to the State or any agency thereof. No rule hereafter
adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with this Article.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-10 (1978).
96. See supra note 82.
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an agency decision that was "[m]ade upon unlawful proceedings." 97 Though
the order issued from an adjudicatory proceeding, the court acknowledged
that it was not the mode of the proceeding that was determinative of the Com-
missioner's underlying authority to make the demand.98 Rather, the court
reasoned that because ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking is permissible only
when the dangers of formal rulemaking would frustrate the agency's functions,
the absence of that danger (1) marked the Commissioner's action as "[m]ade
upon unlawful procedure," and (2) precluded enforcement of the rule as an
order for future cases. The court's analysis, however, is questionable both in
terms of statutory construction and the practical results it portends.
First, involving as it did the exercise of acknowledged discretionary au-
thority to make the demand, the propriety of the Commissioner's request for
audited data did not raise a question of liwful proceedings, but rather one of
responsible exercise of lawful authority. The issue was whether the Commis-
sioner's determination that audited data were required was made in a proce-
durally lawful manner. That issue turned solely upon the existence vel non of
proper Commissioner procedures to make such a demand. In Commissioner v.
NCRB after an agency hearing, the Commissioner made subsidiary findings.
He thereafter concluded that there existed the need for audited data and his
order followed.99 The court's discussion was merely confused by the equivocal
use of "unlawful proceedings" as an additional characterization of what would
have been an already adequate charge: the agency abused its discretion to
choose to act in one way or another. This confusion was, in part, prompted by
the court's failure to see that the NCAPA provision at G.S. 150A-51(4),
"[a]ffected by other error of law," serves both as a prohibition on agency viola-
tions of other relevant statutes and as the expressed statutory basis for the
exercise of the court's equitable powers. The limitation anticipates other
sources of law, not merely other statutes.
Furthermore, an interpretation of the phrase "[a]ffected by other error of
law" as providing one of the means by which a court reviews the appropriate-
ness of agency action'0° speaks more directly to the true concern of the court:
whether the agency exercised good judgment given the existence of alternative
procedures. It also speaks to an important formalistic consideration-the
avoidance of redundancy--which the court thought important in distinguish-
ing the limitations on excess authority and unlawful procedures under G.S.
97. 300 N.C. at 419, 269 S.E.2d at 572.
98. Id at 413, 269 S.E.2d at 569.
99. Id. at 392, 269 S.E.2d at 557.
100. Conceptually, judicial review under the "affected by other error of law" standard should
invite judicial consideration beyond the limited categories provided under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150A-51 (1978). The reviewing court should be empowered to invalidate agency actions that
amount to constitutional or statutory violations, actions that ignore specifically mandated nondis-
cretionary procedures, actions that are not supported by substantial evidence, and actions that are
arbitrary and capricious. But beyond these specific concerns for proper delegation, proper proce-
dures, and proper application of standards, NCAPA's broad prohibition of any "other error of
law" should forbid, among other things, agency actions commonly described as abuses of discre-
tion. When discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under the circumstances of the
case, the action is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented.
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150A-51(2) and (3).1° 1 While the court's view of that distinction was sound, its
own analysis gives rise to a second redundancy. Under the court's analysis,
inappropriate procedures are treated as substantive errors of law to the extent
they reflect breaches of a legal standard. A prohibition of this sort, however, is
already provided by the phrase "[a]ffected by other error of law."' 0 2 Limiting
G.S. 150A-51(3) to review of nondiscretionary procedural concerns, therefore,
avoids the redundancy of two prohibitions addressing substantive violations.
The weakness of the result in Commissioner v. NCRB is also suggested by
the practical implications of the court's decision to ground the procedural limi-
tation of G.S. 150A-51(3) on an interpretation of the exemption at G.S. 150-
10(4) that bars the prospective application of substantive ad hoc adjudicatory
rules. After Commissioner v. NCRB, an agency decision to proceed by ad hoc
rulemaking during an adjudication, while not entirely foreclosed, is to be mea-
sured by (1) the agency's ability to demonstrate clearly preponderating consid-
erations in the particular instance, and (2) the agency's posthearing submission
of the ad hoc rule to the statutorily formalized rule-making procedures prior to
future application. 10 3 These requirements risk the stultification of the admin-
istrative process.1 °4 Their weakness is the court's insistence upon viewing
NCAPA as a control on agency actions rather than as a framework reflecting a
reasonable formula for cooperative interaction among the legislature, agen-
cies, the public, and the courts. In North Carolina the so-called choice be-
tween statutorily formalized rulemaking and rulemaking during the course of
an adjudication will often be a hollow choice. The choice that is left to North
Carolina's administrative agencies is not the choice of an expert acting after
serious consideration of the facts, law, and policy. A reasonable basis is not
enough; agency expertise no longer enjoys the benefit of the doubt. A require-
ment that the balance of considerations favoring adjudication must clearly
preponderate will rule out ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking for the close case,
when all that can be said is that long experience has triggered the expert's
doubts.
The need for agency flexibility has not only been subordinated to the de-
sire for stringent judicial oversight, but even in the newly limited instances in
which the court's considerations favoring ad hoc rulemaking can be met, the
agency is restricted to applying its new rule in only that particular proceeding.
Agency discretion is thus "discretion," for example, to conduct a six-month
adjudicatory hearing (replete with extensive briefs by the parties and dozens of
101. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51(4) (1978).
103. Analyzing the Insurance Commissioner's authority to proceed by formal rulemaking or
ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking, the court concluded that the "superior rule" had been announced
by Professor Cooper and generally adopted by numerous courts some fifteen years earlier, Al-
though the court was in favor of agency discretion to proceed by either rulemaking or adjudica-
tion, the rule endorsed by the court urges that the process of rulemaking be utilized unless there is
a danger of frustrating the agency's function. In weighing such dangers, moreover, the court in-
cluded the admonition, "Unless the balance clearly preponderates in favor of the adhoc adjudica-
tion method, the agency should utilize rule-making procedures." 300 N.C. at 415-16, 269 S.E.2d
at 570-71 (quoting 1 F. CooPER, supra note 1, at 181-82).
104. 332 U.S. at 202.
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witnesses), to compile several thousands of pages of evidence, to review nu-
merous amicus briefs, and when necessary in the course of the proceeding, to
issue a rule that is limited to the parties of record. Without resort to formalized
rulemaking, the rule apparently does not even extend to that identically situ-
ated individual or corporation that has perhaps even submitted an amicus
brief while continuing to engage in the putatively wrongful conduct. This pro-
cedure is not the exercise of discretion, but a waste of agency expertise, money,
time, and information. This result could not have been the legislative intent,
but it is precisely the situation that prevails in light of Commissioner v. NCRB.
In its effort to offer predictability, protection, and fairness, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has pressed the constraints of the procedure paradigm to their
very limit. By reducing agency flexibility, the court has needlessly tipped the
scale against legislative assessments of the appropriate balance between poten-
tially aggrieved parties and agencies.
Had the court been content to limit its resolution to a simple declaration
that under either the Insurance Act or NCAPA, the Commissioner abused his
discretion, the case would have had a de minimis impact upon the administra-
tive process. Pressing the paradigm instead, the court rejected a straightfor-
ward analysis based solely upon equitable considerations. It sought to ground
its determination on NCAPA's specific prohibition of procedural violations
and on the prohibition of arbitrary and capricious conduct. The statutory ba-
sis of the decision not only served the court's announced aim of easing judicial
administration, but it served equally well to preclude the Commissioner's an-
ticipated prospective application of the ad hoc rule.105 The supreme court's
effort to maximize the constraints on the Commissioner implicitly suggests the
political and bureaucratic concerns noted previously. In the process, however,
what was gained in consistency by the pronouncement of new limitations may
well be offset by the need for future clarifications.
2. The Prohibition on Arbitrary or Capricious Conduct
An additional concern is raised by the suggestion made earlier that use of
the "unlawful procedure" standard was a curious way of controlling suppos-
edly irregular use of discretion.106 The court ultimately hAd to consider
whether the Commissioner's demand for audited data could be viewed as an
exercise of discretionary rulemaking that might have then resulted in either a
valid order to the parties or a prospectively applicable nle. 10 7 In effect, the
105. Writing for the Supreme Court in BellAerospace, Justice Powell stated that the Court has
made it clear that agencies are not precluded from announcing new principles in adjudicative
proceedings:
The plurality opinion of Justice Fortas, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Stew-
art, and Mr. Justice White, recognized that "[a]djudicated cases may and do... serve as
vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced
therein," and that such cases "generally provide a guide to action that the agency may be
expected to take in future cases."
416 U.S. at 293-94 (citing NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 765-66).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
107. See supra notes 11, 44 & 82.
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court concluded that the Commissioner's action could not have been achieved
under either result because in these circumstances ad hoc rulemaking
amounted to arbitrary and capricious conduct. In support of this conclusion,
the court suggested numerous difficulties that might stem from the Commis-
sioner's decision.108 The court primarily was concerned that the request need-
lessly imposed ambiguous, unexpected, and extremely expensive demands on
the NCRB--demands that could have been avoided if the Commissioner had
proceeded by formal rulemaking. Balancing the possible gains to the agency
from proceeding by ad hoc rulemaking against the detriments to petitioner,
the court saw the equities as clearly in favor of the latter.10 9
There is, of course, little room for disagreement with the basic desire to
balance the equities; this approach has long been appropriate."10 What is
troublesome, however, is the failure of the court to address evidentiary and
procedural .concerns. For example, at no point does the decision reveal that
concerns with ambiguity, burden to petitioner, and costs of compliance, were
ever laid before the agency for resolution. It is unclear to what extent any or
all of these concerns could have been remedied through the normal give-and-
take of the administrative process. 1  Equally unclear is whether the Commis-
sioner would have clarified or modified his demand in response to specifically
stated needs if he had been confronted by more than a general claim of abuse
on the part of petitioner. It is not that the court has failed to assert justifica-
tions for its result; the problem is that its blast at the Commissioner inevitably
will reverberate down the corridors of other agencies. Those reverberations
may well sound disharmoniously. 112
108. The supreme court noted:
We agree with appellants that the Commissioner's order with respect to audited
data is arbitrary and capricious for these reasons: The order is vague and uncertain in
that (1) it does not establish the extent to which examination of "original source docu-
ments" is required, (2) it does not make clear whether the auditing must be performed by
Certified Public Accountants, other accountants, or actuaries, (3) it does not specify the
degree of precision and reliability required of "statistical sampling," (4) it generally does
not provide appellants with adequate guidelines for compliance with the general conclu-
sion that data in a ratemaking hearing be audited, (5) it includes no determination by the
Commissioner as to the possibility of performance of his new rule nor whether imple-
mentation of the rule would be economically feasible, (6) it includes no determination
whether the statutory time limits could be complied with in face of the new rule, and (7)
it includes no determination whether the "original source data" contemplated by the new
rule is even available for the past years involved in this filing or whether such data, if
available, is located in North Carolina or outside the State in the case of the several
hundred companies writing insurance in this State.
300 N.C. at 420, 269 S.E.2d at 573.
109. Id. at 419, 269 S.E.2d at 572.
110. See, e.g., Cobur v. Board of Comm'rs, 191 N.C. 68, 74, 131 S.E. 372, 375 (1926).
Ill. See, eg., Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295. BellAerospace is notable for the extent to
which the Supreme Court went to avoid interfering with the NLRB's discretion. In permitting the
Board to announce a position contrary to its past conduct, which had the effect of extending Labor
Act protection to a previously unprotected class, the Court referred to the great weight that was
due the Board's discretionary judgment, and closed by reminding protestants that the hearing-
not the court-was the appropriate forum in which to argue the consequences of a rule. See also
supra notes 4 & 5. .
112. The difficulty with the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is that it often masks the
court's real reasoning and thus discourages thoughtful analysis. Daye, supra note 6, at 921. The
[Vol. 61
ADJUDICATORY R ULEMAIKING
An irregularity that leads to a shocking result is not alone reason for la-
beling an agency process arbitrary and capricious. A decision is arbitrary and
capricious if it is based upon either an authoritarian refusal to apply a re-
quired standard or an unprincipled refusal to treat like cases alike. It is
equally true that the phrase applies when an irregular result arises because an
agency has failed to consider legislative intent when it exercised its powers. In
contrast, if in exercising its power to choose either of two permitted courses,
the agency selected the one that under the circumstances departed from the
intended use of its authority, that action would be an abuse of discretion. It
would not be conduct that is arbitrary and capricious, because it lacks the
required departure from past standards of conduct that the phrase connotes.,
1" 3
criterion "arbitrary and capricious" when applied to contested cases seems to function as a "catch-
all." Id Since most cases that may be reversed or modified as "arbitrary or capricious" will fall
under one of the more discrete criteria of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (1978), Daye urges that
courts reviewing contested cases use the criterion "only in those rare instances in which reversal or
modification is necessary because substantial rights may have been prejudiced, but cannot be
justified under the more specific and discrete criteria authorizing judicial intrusion." Daye, supra
note 6, at 921.
The admonition should be carried a step further. The use of "arbitrary and capricious" as a
catchall is never warranted. The term is a term of art, as are NCAPA's other discrete categories,
and should be used as such.
Proper judicial application of these terms was illustrated in Ford Motor Co.v. FTC, 673 F.2d
1008 (9th Cir. 1981). On facts reminiscent of Commissioner v. NCRB, the Ninth Circuit prohibited
the FTC from proceeding by adjudication that would prohibit automobile dealerships from repos-
sessing cars, crediting their defaulting owners with the wholesale value of the car, and then pock-
eting any "surplus" upon the deficiency resale rather than applying it to the defaulter's account.
Under the APA, the court had to determine whether the agency's actions were "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" [the equivalent of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-51(4), (6) (1978)]. Citing Chenery, BellAerospace Co., and Patel v. Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980), the court of appeals concluded that
when the rule announced through adjudication would have general application, and would create
a national interpretation of the U.C.C., the FTC exceeded its authority by proceeding by adjudi-
cation rather than by rulemaking. 673 F.2d at 1009-10.
The court of appeal's resolution in Ford Motor Co. is distinguishable from Commissioner v.
NCRB. The court's concern was with a different kind of impact stemming from the FTC's at-
tempted rulemaking. Had the situation been otherwise, the court of appeals made it clear that a
different result would have been warranted. Given the scope of the proposed rule's likely effect,
the court took exception to the FTC's information gathering capacity:
It [the ad hoc rule] will not apply just to Francis Ford.. . . To allow the order to stand
... would do far more than remedy a discrete violation of a singular Oregon law ...
[lit would create a national interpretation of U.C.C. §9-504 and in effect enact the precise
rule the F.T.C. has proposed, but not yet promulgated.
Id at 1010. Thus, the FTC was confronted with a need for a quasi-legislative information gather-
ing approach. In Commissioner v. NCRB, however, all parties concerned were required partici-
pants in the adjudication and were on notice of the action through the NCRB and Reinsurance
Facility. See supra note 12. Adjudications involving statutorily mandated participation by those
primarily affected by the proposed ad hoc rulemaking were beyond the court's concern in Ford
Motor Co.
113. Thus, the supreme court's discussion of arbitrary and capricious conduct makes analysis
problematic. Although reliance was placed upon Board of Educ. v. Phillips, 264 Ala. 603, 89 So.
2d 96 (1956), the analogy is not persuasive. In that case the Alabama Supreme Court held that
once it is determined that a government agency acted pursuant to delegated authority, "[ilt is
within the discretion of the County Board of Education to determine the need for and location of
schools ... and in the absence of fraud or bad faith or gross abuse of discretion, the courts will
not interfere and.., substitute their judgment .... " Id. at 606, 89 So. 2d at 98. The Alabama
Supreme Court defined gross abuse of discretion as such "an arbitrary and unreasonable act or
conclusion as to shock the sense ofjustice and indicate lack of fair and careful consideration." Id.
at 607, 89 So. 2d at 98-99 (quoting Mullins v. Board of Educ., 249 Ala. 44, 29 So. 2d 339 (1947)).
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C. The Continuing Needfor Flexibility Under NCAPA
In Commissioner v. NCRB the court thought it appropriate to express its
recognition of the fundamental necessity for legislative delegations of power to
agencies. Absent such delegation, it doubted the practicability of requiring the
General Assembly to engage in long term or technical oversight of agencies." t4
The court, however, called upon the Commissioner not to forsake the effort to
develop a pattern of integrated, flexible decisionmaking, but "to follow the
clear lawful procedures prescribed by our Legislature.""II 5 Simultaneously the
supreme court invited the legislature to review and clarify the applicable stat-
utes.116 The court's endorsement of the principles of delegation, when cou-
pled with its reservations, suggests its primary concern with the interface of
these particular statutes, rather than a desire to attack directly the exercise of
agency discretion. We can hope that this more limited concern marks the in-
terpretive bounds of the decision.
We can also hope for a realization on the part of the North Carolina
Supreme Court that if the existence of administrative discretion is restricted by
a highly formalistic application of procedural rules, agencies' capacities for
positive responses will be limited and our long term interest ill served. We
must now reestablish the idea that NCAPA's paradigm can fulfill its purpose
of effectuating policy, if at all, only to the extent that it is utilized to make
projections about the ideal manner in which agencies might operate. Because
no statutory classification can be expected to capture fully the nuances and
shadings of circumstance that exist in the real world, meaningful review of
agency action should not proceed by inquiring whether the exercise of discre-
tion can be analogized to previously sanctioned departures. The focus must be
upon determining whether adequate safeguards exist to prevent abusive de-
partures from model solutions. Only in this way can courts avoid the too easy
slide into substantive review. What is called for is a clear declaration that
subject to specifically stated legislative limitations, agencies are presumed free
to exercise wide discretion to respond flexibly to the circumstances before
them. 117
Thus, despite the North Carolina Supreme Court's intimation that the Alabama Supreme Court
was expressing substantive disagreement with the rule, the Alabama Supreme Court probably was
suggesting no more than the requirement that agency decisions be consistent. See 300 N.C. at 420,
269 S.E.2d at 573 (citing 2 F. COOPER, supra note 1, at 762). It was for this narrower proposition
that Professor Cooper cited the case, noting that agency decisions condemned as "capricious" are
commonly "whimsical, unreasoning departure[s] from established norms or standards." 2 F.
COOPER, supra note 1, at 761-62. Moreover, this narrower meaning is supported by Cooper's fail-
ure to include cases involving substantive review considerations within the list of cases illustrating
capricious conduct. Capriciousness was limited to cases involving "mercurial, unstable, inconsis-
tant, or fickle" agency rule application. Id. at 762. Similarly, Cooper failed to mention Phillps in
connection with the "arbitrary" aspect of the standard. Cooper described arbitrary agency action
as that which "fails to manifest a purpose of complying with the law, or. . .[action] based alone
upon will, and not upon any course of reasoning and exercise of judgment." Id. at 763.
114. 300 N.C. at 421-22, 269 S.E.2d at 573-74 (citing L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIN-
isTRATwvE ACTION 35, 37 (1965)).
115. 300 N.C. at 422, 269 S.E.2d at 574.
116. Id.
117. In the separate but related area of delegation of authority, the role of the judicial watch-
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The statutory paradigm suggested by NCAPA does not require the impo-
sition of a burden on the agency to justify its actions by a preponderance of the
evidence or by any other standard, save the now rigorously tested "reasonable
basis" standard. Absent definitive evidence of legislative intent, higher thresh-
olds arise not as requirements of NCAPA, but from judicial antipathy based
upon distrust of agency discretion. The fundamental consideration is that the
paradigm itself is neutral. It maps the General Assembly's pattern for only the
clear case. As a practical matter this means that where ambiguity arises under
NCAPA, solutions should be found that preserve the widest agency discretion
not expressly prohibited by the legislative scheme, while providing safeguards
for alleged aggrieved parties that are commensurate with the degree of
exposure.
The challenge before the courts, agencies, and legislature is to reconsider
whether our concerns about the sanctity of the paradigmatic model are rooted
in a fear of abuse of agency judgment (and the corresponding urge for the
protective limitations of a highly formal system) or in a commitment to utilize
our models as illustrative points of reference. The first choice carries with it
the danger that the desired limitations will distort the very system we seek to
uphold. The second choice offers the steadier course; our reverence for the
model is not measured by our unwillingness to allow departures from its ideal
results, but by the absence or presence of safeguards against the abuse of such
departures. Our continuing consideration will require, however, the most
dog has long been an important consideration in North Carolina. Declarations of the need for
limits on delegations of authority have been frequent.
The doctrine rests on the bedrock principle gleaned from N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6, which
provides that "the legislature may not abdicate its power to make laws nor delegate its supreme
legislative power to any coordinate branch or to any agency which it may create." Turnpike Auth.
v. Pine Island, 265 N.C. 109, 114, 143 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1965).
This assertion could be read literally to mean that agency discretion is to be controlled by
preventing the legislature from delegating authority in the first place. The supreme court, how-
ever, has identified and confronted the delegation of discretion dilemma and has attempted to
strike a balance. In a series of cases beginning with Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 565, 184
S.E.2d 259, 266 (1971), the court has elaborated upon the "inherent conflict between the need to
place discretion in capable persons and the requirement that discretion be in some manner di-
rected ... " Although the General Assembly needs to delegate to administrative bodies in order
to legislate effectively, such delegations must be subject to court scrutiny to ensure that they are
indeed necessary and do not constitute a total abdication of legislative power by the General
Assembly.
Nevertheless, resolution of the conflict between practical necessity and formalism did not
require resort to a newly discovered and more stringent standard of administrative responsibility.
Cf. supra note 4 & text accompanying note 40. The growing trend of authority, with which the
supreme court has recently aligned itself, was said to recognize that it is "the presence or absence
of procedural safeguards that is relevant to the broader question of whether a delegation of au-
thority is accompanied by adequate guiding standards." Adams v. North Carolina Dept. of Natu-
ral & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 698, 249 S.E.2d 402, 411 (1978) (citing 1 K. DAvis,
ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATIsE, § 3.15, at 210 (2d ed. 1978)). Moreover, one of the sources of
procedural safeguards that the court cited was NCAPA. Id at 701, 249 S.E.2d at 412.
With respect to the decision to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication, recognition of discre-
tionary administrative authority coupled with the procedural safeguard of judicial review for a
rational basis would have been more desirable. If the North Carolina Supreme Court insists that
rule-making procedures should be used unless the balance clearly preponderates in favor of ad
hoc adjudication, the court needlessly and at untold cost has elevated form over substance in
precisely the analytical manner that it so recently rejected in the context of delegation.
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careful construction of NCAPA provisions in order to distinguish between
those considerations that are essential to NCAPA's application and those that
are not. In short, we can either continue to press the paradigm under a gener-
alized view that the need for agency discretion ought to be minimized, or we
can temper our concern for limits with a far more useful attentiveness for re-
sults that give the widest breadth possible to the legislative will as reflected in
NCAPA.
